Catching up on 7 years of Entrapment Incident Reports Involving Heavy Equipment

Background

As I described in my March 24 post, my 2024 Safety Audit indicated I have been negligent in my Hazard, Close Call and Incident reporting involving entrapments and burn-overs when responding to wildfires with heavy equipment.

Hazard observations, Close Call and Incident Reports provide us with the free lessons and are key components of any safety management system. I should know better so am trying to make amends with the info below.

Almost every wildfire responder I talk to in the off season has a close call story. We are all getting complacent about working in close proximity to large and intense wildfires. I am very worried that we are going to have a large-scale entrapment/burn-over related tragedy in the near future. 

 

 

Stopping for photos. Beware of Complacency.

Extreme caution is required here. A dead radio battery, sprained ankle, electrical glitch, blown hose, tree across the road, flat tire, undetected spot fire or any other minor problem would make the situation much worse very quickly. 

 

All my fire response experience is as a contractor on a when needed/as available basis. Starting in 2017 my focus has been on Line Location and Construction Supervision working with industry heavy equipment teams. We are usually at the head of the fire doing Initial Attack. All the incidents described below involve heavy equipment supplied by industry. 

Common Factors in Fire Entrapments

Factor # 1 is from my personal experience. Factors 2 to 7 are from US Forest Service research. 

1. Gap in supervision/leadership
2. Small fires or quiet portion of large fire
3. Light fuels
4. Change in wind direction and/or speed
5. Steep slopes
6. Occur in peak burn periods
7. Most entrapments occur within 17 minutes of a wildfire “blowing up”.

Supervision and Leadership

Almost all the close calls and incidents described below had poor supervision and leadership as a root cause or at least contributing factor. The supervisors were from BC Wildfire, Structural Fire Crews, other Government Agencies and Industry.

I have seldom encountered poor supervision because of negligence. We have all had a lot of turn-over in recent years. Inexperience, poor training, and lack of support are more often why supervisors struggle. Most are just very conscientious about wanting to get the job done and maybe try too hard or stay too long. 

Good supervision and leadership is key to reducing the chances of wildfire entrapment and burn-overs:

• Establish LACES and Conduct a Crew Briefing.
• Monitor for the WATCHOUT Situations. 
• Be aware that heavy equipment usually only has one escape route. Reduce the acceptable risk required to acheive objectives. 
• Maintain that workable 5 to 7 Span of Control.
• Ensure everyone understands the Chain of Command but that information can go all directions. 
• Have a good workable system of tracking resources. Delegate this task to a Staging Area Manager when necessary. 
• Keep your head on a swivel. Avoid getting buried in a specific task.
• Revise your objectives if you don’t have adequate resources. 
• Avoid setting objectives that require everything to go right. What can go wrong, will go wrong, usually at the worst possible time. 
• Treat your crew the way you would like to be treated. Always think about their family. 
• Always consider the Risks and Rewards of any planned work.
• Encourage input and feedback from your operators.  
• Address any safety related crew concerns about the planned work promptly.
• Base your actions on current and expected fire behavior. (Weather and fire forecasts)
• Anticipate increasing fire intensity and leave early.
• It is better to be in the Safe Zone an hour too early than a minute too late. 
• Decide when to withdraw to your Safe Zone based on the travel time of your slowest machine (Bunchers = 3 kph on good road)
• Make sure your folks are adequately trained, give them clear directions, check that they are doing the assigned tasks safely and correctly, and implement appropriate actions to correct any outages. 

Our number 1 daily objective should always be that all our workers go home healthy and safe at the end of every shift. 

Let’s reel this in, improve our supervision, stay a little further away from active fire, leave a little earlier, and increase our close call and incident reports and investigations. 

Here are the anecdotal incident summaries as I remember them. These all occurred on fires I was working and some of the errors that contributed to the incident were mine.  None involved any injuries but this was mostly due to good luck.

2017

1. During initial response an equipment team stayed too long and tried too hard to contain a rapidly intensifying Rank 4-5 wildfire. Heavy equipment had to be abandoned and crews had to drive through the fire to get to safety. 

2018

3. A heavy equipment team was working the flank of a fire with the objective of cutting off a large switchback and squaring the control line. There was wet ground at the half way point of the proposed line.

The wind swung 90 deg and increased speed substantially. The flank being worked became the head of the fire. Fire behavior increased rapidly from Rank 2/3 to Rank 4/5. The supervisors gave everyone the notice to withdraw. With- in 15 minutes two bulldozers got stuck and an excavator broke a track pin at the head of the fire with spot fires igniting around them.

A rookie (first week) BC Wildfire Crew Leader took charge and coordinated the withdrawal. The threatened operators and their machines were able to make it to a parking spot. Most of the operators were able to get to safety via the number one escape route but 5 were cut off and were unaware of the second escape route.

A supervisor drove around to escort them out. The workers had to drive through active Rank 3 to Rank 5 fire to get to safety.

When a head count was complete one worker was unaccounted for. Two supervisors drove back into the fire to search for him until he was located with another crew.

4, Later in the same fire there was a group of operators that refused unsafe work. They felt the plan and objectives were too aggressive and put the operators and equipment at unnecessary risk.

2021

5. On the first day of the first big fire of the year a buncher was trapped by rapidly spreading fire. Airtankers had to drop retardant on the machine to get it out to safety.

6. Four times industry run teams stayed too long at the head of the fire as the weather got hotter and drier and the winds increased. Adjacent fire behavior varied from Rank 3 to Rank 5. All operators and equipment made it out but any equipment problems would have resulted in losses.

7. Four pieces of heavy equipment were utilizing an alternate and untested evacuation route. The trip took longer than expected and a Rank 5 fire burned over them for about 500 m. They were able to keep rolling and made it through unscathed. One of the operators had 20 years of experience on a Unit Crew and said that was his closest call. He was expecting his first child in four days.

8. A large fire took a late day aspect and terrain induced run towards a ranch and rural community. The residents had vowed to stay no matter what. A supervisor saw the intensity of the blowup and realized the risk it posed to the residents. With the help of a local the supervisor travelled an alternate route into the community with the intent of talking the residents into leaving for safety. He found 30 well meaning, brave, but ill equipped and generally untrained volunteers who had showed up to help the residents and were refusing to leave.

All escape routes appeared compromised but there was a large meadow that, based on the existing S100 training, appeared large enough to keep everyone safe. The supervisor convinced the residents to move to the safe zone as the fire approached. The safe zone provided adequate protection from the radiant heat and ember blizzard. However, the plume of superheated gas and smoke associated with the Rank 5 inferno was rolling out well ahead of the main fire, often only 50 ft over their heads. This plume would periodically ignite creating tremendous heat. The residents had to take survival actions several times.

Research from the US Forest Service says 1.2 km Safe Separation Distance is required for this fire behavior

During the post incident review, I discovered the US Forest Service has conducted considerable research into Safe Zones and we needed to be much further away. The information in the BC S100 is out of date.

9. An equipment team was constructing line approximately 1 to 2 km away from the fire flank. The constructed line was the only escape route and there was a pinch point approximately 200 meters from the fire edge.

A Line Locator suffered a medical emergency due to heat stroke. There was confusion regarding the medivac and poor communications, The supervisor of the equipment group was acting as the Lookout at the pinch point but left to coordinate the evacuation. While he was gone the fire picked up intensity and a Rank 5 fire ran to within 50 meters of the pinch point and continued past for two km. Any minor change in wind direction would have cut off the escape route.

10. Two industry supervisors were utilized as Line Locators and Construction Supervisors. They ribboned the proposed line successfully and, by radio instructed the equipment operators to start following the pink ribbon line. No Crew Briefing was provided. The operators followed the line into a deep, rocky gulley with steep sides. They couldn’t make their way out and couldn’t reach the industry supervisors on the radio. Helicopter bucketing and support from BC Wildfire crews was required to get them out to safety.

The industry supervisors were located off site. They had misunderstood their instructions so weren’t supervising the heavy equipment and hadn’t checked in with their BCWS Supervisor before leaving the fire.

2022

11. A heavy equipment team left the staging area to build downhill guard through thick timber with a heavy load of deadfall. The supervisor organized the Leader of a Structure Protection crew working off the staging area to act as a Lookout. He stressed with the Lookout that the equipment’s only way out was back up towards the fire so lots of notice of any increase in fire activity would be required to get everyone back up the line and out to safety in time.

Approximately two hours later a Line Locator came up the line to the staging area to shuttle a pickup truck. He noted that the fire had run right to the staging area and the Structure Protection crew had departed. It was unlikely the heavy equipment would make it back to staging before their route was burned over.

The heavy equipment group found another way out and with the help of an adjacent BC Wildfire Crew all the operator’s pickups were shuttled down the road.

When the incident was discussed with the Lookout it was discovered that he had no experience with heavy equipment and didn’t realize how slow it travelled.

2023

12. a) An equipment group was asked to build a downhill guard towards the fire, late in the day, with a fire behavior warning in place. The south facing terrain was steep and rocky. If the fire wasn’t held at this proposed line the next opportunity was several kilometers away. The fire was burning in very high value timber.

The crew referred to the 18 Watch Out Situations and refused the work.

The fire crossed the proposed line 1 hour later.

b) A buncher was cutting a control line downhill in thick timber with a heavy load of deadfall. A Unit Crew was building a line uphill toward him but struggling in the steep ground and heavy fuels. Any work the buncher could do would alleviate considerable work for them. 

The buncher came to a steep gulley. The operator and the Line Locator walked it and thought there was a possible route through. The slope was very steep and south facing, there was active fire below them with unburnt heavy fuels between, the weather was getting hotter and drier and the wind increasing. 

The team decided to back off and the buncher walked out the 1 hour to the road to park. Fifty meters from the road the buncher suffered a mechanical breakdown and was parked there for 18 hours.

The fire picked up and crossed the gulley where the buncher had turned around 45 minutes after departure. 

13. Over two days an equipment team comprised of 15 machines, working the head of the fire, was chased out 5 times by advancing flames. Each time the last few machines had fire all around them as they departed.

On the second day the Rank 5 fire was advancing to the temporary staging at a gravel pit 1 km from the highway. Traffic on the highway was bumper to bumper and crawling as two communities evacuated. There was Rank 4 fire on both sides of the highway.

The crew decided they did not want to get trapped on the hwy in traffic and chose the gravel pit as the best choice for a survival zone. They started to improve it. 

At the last minute lowbeds became available and the highway traffic cleared. The equipment was moved another 10 km or so to a large field but still at the head of the fire. The last three lowbed trips drove through active fire. Another equipment group joined them there. The equipment cleared the surface fuels to mineral soil and parked in the middle. By the time they had completed the work the fire was going around and over them.

The adjacent fire camp had the fire go over and around it.

Parked but not hopeful about its chances of survival

As the operators left the site to head for home they turned onto the Trans Canada Hwy. The fire burned over them again while they travelled out of the area. The highway was still open, traffic was heavy and visibility zero for several km.

2024

A fire had taken a large run the previous day and adequate extra supervision had not arrived on site. An equipment team (Crew 1) was trying to establish a control line above the fire. A separate group had walked their machines 4 km to improve a pump and fill site for water delivery.

A second (Crew 2) full strike team was still working on another road system in the area burning before the big run.

The terrain was very steep (40% to 70%), east facing. with a very heavy load of large diameter deadfall. Fuel indices were all very high. The supervisor recognized the risks associated with the slopes and fuels and started the team early to avoid the anticipated heat of the day.

At the 0400 startup the temp was 12deg C., RH was 45% and wind was calm. Fire behavior was Rank 2

The supervisor got the Crew 1 going on the new line, assigned a young skidder operator as Lookout and informed an arriving BC Wildfire Crew of the work, situation and risks. A young BCWS crew member was assigned as a second Lookout. The supervisor left the site to coordinate the Crew 2 activities stating he would be monitoring the weather and would return before the day heated up.

At approximately 0630 the sun came up and hit the east facing slope below Crew 1. Fire activity and rate of spread immediately intensified to Rank 3/4 and started a rapid uphill run. Both the skidder operator and BCWS Lookouts identified the increasing fire behavior immediately and initiated a withdrawal. An alternate escape route was identified for the group working at the pump site to speed their escape.

The BCWS crewmember requested a helicopter which arrived promptly and bucketed the approaching fire while the equipment made its way out.

The Supervisor that had left the Crew 1 location had the roster of who was on site so there was some confusion during the final head count. Eventually the BCWS crewperson and the skidder operator determined that everyone made it to the Safe Zone well before the fire threatened their work area.

END