I worked on a wildfire this summer then spent the fall doing layout for salvage harvest and assisting with the fire rehab. It gave me a chance to revisit the area mentioned in my Aug. 4 post (link below) and add to my observations on improving the wildfire resilience of our regenerated stands.
We are planting trees to produce a marketable product at some point in the future. We rely on selling logs to pay for all the other management objectives in our plans. The planted trees represent a substantial initial cost to the Licensee and potential future income to the taxpayers. Losing a plantation to fire is a major set back, especially to small area based tenures such as Woodlots and Community Forests. Almost inevitably the taxpayer will be out of pocket.
The Fire
This fire occurred predominantly in the MSdm2. The main drainage that burned was a North running valley with steep side slopes that varied from 0 to 70%. The drainage had experienced substantial harvesting since the 1970’s with plantations being predominantly Pl and ranging from 1 year old to 50+ years. The site was productive. The 50 year old planted trees had reached merchantable size with a volume of 175 to 200 m3 per ha. I may have planted some of these trees.
A wide riparian reserve ran the length of the drainage containing an extremely heavy fuel load of large diameter standing (200sph) and down dead Sx and Bl. There were substantial reserves in the valley due to adjacency standards and inoperable ground.
Here are my additional fall observations:
1. Reducing the surface fuels is the key to protecting our regen.
This isn’t new but how much we have to remove may surprise folks especially to protect the regen in the first 5 to 10 years. It is very susceptible to mortality with even a smoldering ground fire.
When I started my tree-planting career in the 70’s every block we planted had been burned. Sometimes they were still burning.
We lost broadcast burning as a tool about 30 years ago. So it appears that any regen stands older than 30 years, that were burned prior to planting, have a far higher chance of survival with minimal damage. Stands younger than 30 years old are far more susceptible to fire damage.
Other methods (excavator rake, pile and burn) of post-harvest fuel reduction appear to be almost as successful at reducing losses. See previous blog below.
Stumpage will need to be adjusted to reflect the added costs of all these treatments.
2. Adjacent fuels loads affect regen survival. Riparian reseves and wildlife tree patches increase the fire intensity and appear to contribute to damage to adjacent stands of regen. As the flavor of the day moves to higher retention in harvest areas foresters should consider the possble effects of the elevated fuels loads on future fire behavior and related damage to the young planted trees.
A very wide riparian reserve ran the length of the main drainage and numerous retained and reserved areas had been established.
Pictured is typical fuel load in the reserved and retained areas before the fire. Over mature Sx Bl – 200 sph standing dead with heavy load of deadfall.
Note the severe damage to regen adjacent to WTP in the background and decreasing damage further away.
The intense Rank 5 fire in the WTP and associated convective column are the culprit.
The convective column can carry heat far greater distances than previously thought (up to 2.5 km) Google new US Forest Service Safe Zone guidelines.
On this fire it appears that the heavy fuel load in the riparian reserves and leave patches created, or at least contributed to, the fire storm (Rank 5/6) that consumed everything in the drainage.
3. Site prep (trenching, mounding) doesn’t appear to reduce fire behavior or associated damage noticeably.
Intensity Class 4 in Mounded block. Planted previous year.
4. Crown closure appeared to reduce damage from wildfire. Stands with closed crowns have higher RH, lower temperature and reduced wind speed than adjacent openings. Crown closure limits sunlight available for ingress of grass and brush under the canopy and initiates self-pruning. (Limiting surface and ladder fuels). There is a trend for lower stocking standards in fuel modification projects. This needs more research. Increased planting density may actually be a better choice for wildfire resilience and wood quality.
+/- 10 year old stand before. Wide spacing, branches to the ground, lots of sun for grass and brush. Surface fuels heat up substantially.
Reduced chance of survival in a wider range of weather conditions
Extreme early crown closure in fire origin Pl. Generally these stands are naturally able to survive all but the most extreme fire behavior. We lost some of these in the Heat Dome as they basically were tall grass.
Note: This picture is from another fire and used as an example only. An approching fire did slow and drop in intensity when it hit this stand.
I couldn’t come to any definitive conclusion on how the age that the crown closure occurs affects survival. It appears that resiliency improves if crowns close in the 5-to-10-year range. This is rough field observations and is an opportunity for detailed research.
50 year old stand with crown closure. Cooler, moister, calmer. Adjacent fire in reserves was Rank 5 but dropped to Rank 2 when it hit this stand.
5. Some BCWS supervisors may not be aware of the potential costs associated with the loss of regen. Licensee’s should make sure BCWS supervisors and planners are fully aware of these costs and push for agressive action when priorities allow or be prepared to take action on their own.
Regen blocks (mid-frame) still burning a month after the fire was “under control”. These hot spots were well inside the fire perimeter and posed little threat of escape. Logically, and as per BC Emergency Management System priorities, crews were sent to other higher priority incidents.
Licensee may have to be prepared to take action on their own to protect assets.
Initial stages of the blowup that nuked the drainage pictured above.
Order some more seedlings.
6. During intense fire activity we are going to incur losses. Minimizing the damage may be the only option.
These are rough field observations and may not apply to other sites but I think we have opportunities to better protect our investments and future forests.
The recent discussions about forming a federal wildfire response agency have generated a lot of discussion and opinions from experts on where to focus our taxpayer money. Should we increase our response capacity or increase fuel modification?
As is usual the answer is a bit of both. Our wildlands are in such poor condition we are going to be facing catastrophic fires for a generation no matter how much we spend on fuel modification and climate action.
Fire jumped a large fuel modified area, entered private property and threatened a community. Good work by crews to hold it and limit damage to critical infrastucture and business’s
Fuel modification works but the current delivery model renders it almost cost prohibitive. It is seldom conducted on private property.
Very low intensity fire in fuel modified area. Crews could safely work right at the fire edge.
We can’t afford to have enough specialized crews available to meet all our response needs all the time.
Awsome folks. Trained, fit, equipped and motivated but expensive.
Photo courtesty BCWS
Our government has a lot of pressing priorities (Hungry kids, homeless people, criminal activtiy, the drug crisis, long health-care wait times, crowded classrooms, etc.) that require tax dollars. In all honesty, to me these take priority. We need to figure out how to get this fuel modification completed and increase our response capacity more efficiently and cost-effectivly so the government can keep providing these other valuable services.
I think there is a common set of solutions to both problems.
Fuel Modification Suggestions:
Simplify and streamline the planning and prescription process
Include maintenance and long-term treatments in the plans
Ensure that reducing fuel load cost effectively remains the main, over-riding objective even when other social and environmental concerns are raised
Revise or eliminate stumpage to continue to encourage utilization of materials from fuel mod projects whenever possible
Award multi-year fuel modification contracts to proven contractors in each BC Wildfire Zone. Safety, quality, and production records should be the leading criteria for evaluating contractors with price being a lower factor.
Long term agreements will enable contractors to provide more cost effective services to private land owners
Response Suggestions:
We already have a federal centralized firefighting coordination center. (CIFFC). Rather than a federal response agency it is likely more effective to have CIFFC standardize the requirements for existing fire crews across Canada so we know what we are getting when we request help from other provinces. From my experience the higher up the bureaucratic food chain the more ponderous and indecisive the government is. Keeping the response as local as possible is preferable.
Include Response Services in the proposed long-term Fuel Modification Contracts described above. Most of the skills are transferable between the two sectors. This would ensure that a pool of properly trained, experienced, equipped, physically fit, local crews were available as supplemental fire fighters in every Zone when needed. They would still be doing valuable and productive work in periods of reduced fire danger.
Establish a training center in every BCWS Fire Zone so we can continue to improve wildfire training for folks in all industries, government agencies and communities
One of my best fire crews ever.
Local Contract Silviculture Crew turned contract fire fighters. Trained, fit, equipped, safe, production oriented, versatlie, self sufficient, with local knowledge. Already have long term relationships with local forest companies.
No fires = no expense to taxpayers as they have other projects on the go.
Photo courtesy A&G Reforestation
Lets get away from debating either/or when considering whether increasing fuel modification or increasing response capacitiy is “the” solution to our current problem. We can acheive both in a much more cost effective and efficient way.
I am just finishing up the summer field season which included Line Location and Construction Supervision on a few fires in the Southern Interior of BC.
Except in periods of very low fire behavior we lost fires in preserved and unmanaged land. This included parks, streamside (riparian) reserves, wildlife tree patches, special management zones (OGMA, Wildlife, Recreation, Visual Quality), Community Watersheds, grasslands where grazing was excluded, inoperable areas due to topography or economics, and areas where access had not been adequately maintained. Besides the reduced chance of success safety of crews was a prime consideration in these areas.
Where we stopped fires was in well managed forests and rangeland with adequate access. We achieved our best succeses in areas that had been clearcut (>100ha), broadcast burned and planted in the 1970’s, had been continuously grazed since and had an active road system. We often didn’t even need to construct a guard here and just used these stands as is to stop the fire.
Take a deep breath. I am not saying we clearcut every park and watershed and OGMA in BC. I am suggesting we have to set priorities and manage these areas better. As I have stated in previous posts, preservation is usually neglect.
My best job ever in forestry was logging riparian areas (the reserved, machine-free, strip of land adjacent to streams). I had an old line skidder with a 100′ tag line. I hand fell the merch trees and winched them out without the machine entering the sensitive zones. We maintained the integrity of the forest floor and left the understory intact. The treatment created a “feathered” edge reducing the chance of any retained larger trees blowing down. It wasn’t very profitable but was good forest management and usually broke even. With modern logging equipment this work would be much more viable economically.
There is no “one size fits all” answer to what is good forest management. We have 14 general Biogeoclimatic Ecosystms in BC with several variants based on specific site conditions. All need special consideration and specific actions.
However I suggest that we have to do something in these preserved, high value, areas to make the inevitable wildfire more manaeagable and reduce unneccesary losses and damage.
Typical fuel load in a protected area or reserve. This is a very dangerous location to work and will produce very elevated fire behavior.
Blowdown in Wildlife Tree Patch. The inevitable wildfire will be very intense, spread rapidly and send embers considerable distances.
Blowdown in Riparian Reserve – one big potentail wick to carry fire across the block.
Grazing excluded – Fire went from start to 150 ha. in a few hours and burnt into community infrastructure.
Success!
+/- 30 year old regen Pl and Sx. Large clearcut, broadcast burned and planted. No surface fuel, grass grazed annually, crown closure = lower temp and higher RH. Rank 4 fire stopped at edge of stand with no control line necessary.
Late last month I worked on a fire that re-burned very intensely on a site that previously burned in 2018. . This is the shortest interval and most intense re-burn I have experienced.
The fire occurred in the Southern Interior. When I was given the location I relaxed a bit. The site had burned at moderate to high intensity in 2018 and I had worked on it then.
As I approached I realized my assumption was wrong.
Aerial view of unexpectedly intense fire activity. Photo courtesy BC Wildfire
The site hadn’t had any salvage harvest post 2018 fire. I am not sure why. Most of the standing Lodge-pole pine had been killed by the original fire. Lodge-pole pine has low resistance to decay and after five years of standing dead is very prone to blowdown. Most of the dead trees had come down forming a deep, continuous mat of deadfall. There was a high volume of grass ingress but the blowdown prevented the cattle from grazing it. There was very dense five to six year old healthy Pl regen growing through the grass and blowdown.
This created a very intense 2025 wildfire that damaged a brand new fence line (+/-$20,000/km), killed the five year old pine regen and set the soils back almost to a post glacial state.
This site burned in 2018. This severe damage is due to very intense fire behaviour in the 2025 re-burn.
Post fire salvage logging decisions have to be site specific but people should be aware of the negetive implications of not harvesting burnt trees.
I am convinced that not logging this site after the 2018 fire shortened the wildfire return interval and made the 2025 fire more intense and damaging.
Managing post harvest fuel loads is the best thing we can do to protect our next generation of trees but there is more we can do.
In Lodge-pole Pine (Pl) stands, we should be establishing earlier crown closure through increased density of planted and natural trees. This will more closely mimic fire origin forests which will improve the stands resilience to wildfire, improve log quality and shorten the rotation time to get the stand to merchantable size. It appears to me that 6000 to 10,000 sph seems to be a good intial density. Post harvest fuel reduction treatments may acheive this without increasing required planting.
I am just back from working with heavy equipment groups on a few local wildfires. We stopped a Rank 4/5 wildfire by constructing a control line in a +/- 100 ha. stand of lodge-pole pine (Pl) that was clearcut in 1972, broadcast burned and then planted and juvenile spaced (thinned). There was crown closure so grass growth was limited with no understory. This was a stand of merchantable sawlogs after only 50 years. We figured we could get two 20 ft logs out of each tree if we needed to salvage log.
The BC Wildfire Fire Behavior folks made a good video on the fire and control line. It is great to see them considering the interactions of land management treatments with wildfire and looking for win/win opportunities.
Over the years I have seen a substantial amount of younger planted stands in the Southern Interior burn severely. I have walked them to try and figure out why.
The value of post harvest fuel reduction in protecting the next generation of trees is well known and accepted. However, even on sites with low post harvest fuel loads I often see high losses and damage to regenerated trees. On a fire in July this year I saw a patch of 5 year old regen Pl destroyed on an area that burned very intensely in 2018.
As discussed in the video I feel grass is often a main contributing factor. Grass dries quickly, ignites easily and allows fire to spread rapidly. Even though the fire intensity associated with grass fuels is relatively low it is enough to kill most young trees.
The current common inter-tree planting distance of +/- 1.5 to 2.5 meters between trees allows a lot of moisture and sunlight to hit the ground for the first 20 years of a planted trees life. This contributes to grass growth and / or raises the surface fuel temperature and lowers the humidity more than in a denser stand. Grazing may help keep the grass down but cattle damage and wide spacing may lower the eventual log quality.
Pl planted at low density. Heavy grass, large branches to ground, big rings, heavy taper. Very susceptible to wildfire and very low lumber quality
I believe the stocking standards for wildfire risk reduction projects are even lower which may make the situation worse.
We are always going to suffer losses during extreme fire weather but I think we could reduce the frequency and severity of the damage by increasing stand density to reduce grass ingress.
Background Info on Lodge-pole Pine
We are planting trees to produce lumber at some point in the future. Pl is the most widely planted species. We can achieve a lot of other objectives but lumber, and associated products, are what pay the bills. Woodlots, Community Forests, First Nations Licensee’s and large corporations all need to sell logs to produce lumber to make money and continue operating.
The best quality and highest value logs for lumber have tight grain, no (or few) knots, and little taper.
Increasing the height of a tree increases the volume of the tree far more than increasing the diameter of the tree.
Pl is a fire origin species. It needs fire to regenerate. After a fire it is very common to see 100,000 stems per ha. of natural regeneration.
When the branches of young Pl touch the branches of an adjacent tree something happens and that tree will start putting growth on it’s leader (top) and start to shed its lower limbs that are no longer gathering sunlight.
Fire origin Pl is tall, skinny, has very tight grain, very few branches or knots and very little taper.
Hence, a stand of dense, tall, small diameter Pl generally has far more volume and value than low density stands.
Clear cut harvest is the method that most closely resembles the effects of wildfires on a site.
Juvenile spacing (thinning) of 20 year old stands was very common treatment to try and encourage diameter growth. In fact it generally devalued the next stand substantially by delaying crown closure and allowing prolonged branch growth.
+/- 200,000 sph Pl germinants the spring following a wildfire
+/- 250,000 sph 10 years old fire origin Pl stand. Crown closure has occurred. Lowest limbs starting to shed.
No grass under the trees. Reduced chance of re-burn except in extreme fire weather.
Note: +/- 10,000 sph expressing dominance over neighbours (blue arrows)
Fire Origin Pl stand at 30-40 years – Tall skinny stems, no branches, little taper. Self spacing and pruning.
Fire origin Pl stand at +/- 60 years. Substantial surface fuel but crown closure lowers temp and raises RH. This also accelerates decompositon of surface fuels.
Reduced potential fire behavior in all but the hottest, driest and windiest conditions.
Fire origin Pl stand at 60-80 years. Crown closure has accelerated decomposition of surface fuels. Few ladder fuels. Lower chance of crown fire.
Fire origin Pl stand at 80 -100 years. Reaching the end of its life span. Understory of Sx and Bl ingressing. Highly susceptible to pests, disease and fire.
Pl 100 plus years – tick tock tick tock
These pictures are from various locations but I am sad to say I have observed most of this progression first hand in a stand of trees next to our family property.
I have laid out and harvested two moderate to high volume stands of fire origin Pl that were younger than me (<65 years). The stands were dense, the trees were tall, had little taper, had no branches for 20 meters, only the top 20% had live limbs, the grain was tight with only a few small knots. The lumber produced from these stands was the highest quality and value with almost all going to engineered wood products.
Our industry has ever increasing demands on how we operate and an ever diminishing area to work on. Based on my walk throughs I feel that by establishing and maintaining crown closure very early we will improve a stands wildfire resiliency, increase the eventual lumber volume and quality while shortening the time required to get a stand to marketable size.
These suggestions are obviously generalizations and are all based on my walkthroughs and initial ponderings. They will need some real science to solidfy my thoughts.
This may apply to Firesmart and fuel mod projects as well. The current standard of 3 m. intercrown spacing has me concerned. Increasing the value of logs from fuel modified areas may make treatments profitable.
Give me a call if you want some more information or drink some coffee and go look around.
The recent alarmist headlines and poor journalism is misleading the public into thinking that clearcutting is the leading cause of large floods. The reporting was very narrow and one-sided. None of the articles I have read researched or presented any alternate viewpoints.
I am wading through the original report that is the subject of the articles. The research was conducted in a water shed in South Carolina. So far, I am questionning the findings, or at least whether the results are applicable in our area.
I was born, and have lived in, the same area of the southern interior of BC for most of my life. For most of that time I have resided on, or near, rivers and lakes.
I was an emergency responder in a community located on a flood plain for 20 years and had to deal with numerous high water and flood events in that time.
I am aware of four major flood events in our valley, 1894, 1949, 1972, and 2021. As a responder from 1994 to 2015 I also dealt with several “high water” events.
As we prepared for high water emergencies, we analyzed past events and came up with the following prioritized list of root causes:
1. Record, or near record, deep snow packs with rapid runoff due to either:
a) a longer than usual winter with a sudden late spring/early summer hot spell
or
b) an extreme rain event on heavy, late fall/early winter snowpack)
2. Improper diking with lack of maintenance and no stream bed dredging
3. Uncontrolled development on floodplains
4. Upslope urbanization (paved roads, parking lots and storm drains preventing water from absorbing into soils)
5. We recently included large and intense wildfires.
Here are some questions for the researchers that I feel the reporters should have asked:
a) Where does clearcutting fit into our list of prioritized root causes re: effect on flood frequency and consequences?
b) What is going to increase the frequency and severity of flooding more – a well planned clearcut or large, out of control wildfire?
c) Considering the required, rapid re-forestation that takes place on all logged areas how long will the alleged effects of clearcutting on flood potential last?
d) In our area of the Southern Interior we experience drought, and water shortages, far more regularly than floods. Do clearcuts add to the available water for human use in drought years?
As well I feel we should be careful where we get our advice. According to their own website hydrologists do not have professional designation and hence no governing body to set or enforce standards of practice. They are like “ecologists” or “geographers”. Their knowledge may be valuable but they cannot sign land management plans or prescriptions or even give advice.
Also, I suggest we use care on listening to, and reporting on, people who are constantly raging “against” something without offering sound alternate solutions.
Here are some personal experiences that may have improved the perspective of the articles:
1. Clearcuts don’t stay clearcuts for long. They are reforested promptly after harvest. The two pictures below are off a stand of trees that was clearcut in 1957. It is a forest.
The basin pictured below has been harvested (clearcuts of various sizes) almost entirely at various intervals since the late 1960’s.
I was just working here. It looks like a forest, smells like a forest, sounds like a forest and feels like a forest. Give me a call and I can take you out there to show you.
Clearcuts may be the most desirable form of harvesting trees depending on the ecosystem and management objectives.
2. In my experience our best chance to stop wildfires is on managed lands. (ie: cut-blocks, roads, grazed areas and trails). We recently stopped an approaching intense wildfire burning at the edge of the area pictured above in a 50-year-old planted stand. It was clearcut in 1972, broadcast burned, replanted.
In my experience we lose fires, and they burn more intensely, in areas that are protected such as riparian leave strips, parks, wild-life tree patches, ecological reserves and other protected areas. The extremely heavy fuel load in the reserved area pictured below will make any chance of successful fire suppression unlikely.
3. The effects of wildfires on a water shed can be immediate and severe. Below is a picture of local medium sized river just downstream of an active, large and intense wildfire after only a 45-minute moderate rain fall. The area hadn’t had any logging since the early 1960’s and the valley burned side to side at very high intensity due to the extremely heavy fuel load (pictured above) and steep slopes. Landslides and washouts occurred, the water supply became undrinkable and the water level rose dramatically.
I didn’t observe any water or soil issues on the adjacent recent logged areas or upstream of the burned area.
Feel free to contact me anytime and I can show you around the local forest and discuss this further.
I am just back from working with a heavy equipment group on a few wildfires and once again marvel at the value these folks bring to wildfire response.
The forest industry in BC is facing numerous and well documented external and internal pressures. The industry has been in decline for years and I fear it could actually dissappear. For the first time in my career, when we called contractors to supply heavy equipment, there was limited availability due to current industry conditions.
Our wildfire response will be considerably slower, more costly and less effective without these local industry crews and their equipment. I have worked with fire crews from areas in the USA where the forest industry has shut down. They all praise what our industry heavy equipment teams can accomplish far more safely and quickly than they are able to with adhoc equipment or by hand.
The contractors and their crews are not firefighters but display incredible courage as they lead the way during initial actions on a wildfire. To them it is just part of the job of being a forest worker. They punch the control line through difficult condtions that then acts as the “Anchor” for all subsequent response actions.
Just another day in the life of a logger. This is the dozer operators first day on his first fire – performing like a wiley veteran.
Local Licensee’s and their contractors have skin in the game. It is usually their future livelihood that is burning. In the first few days of a fire the local companies offer considerable logistical support to get the response going as safely, quickly and efficiently as possible.The equipment operators supplied by local contractors are self-sufficent, production oriented, well trained, versatile and innovative. Their machines are designed for the work and well maintained. The contractors have a safety program that exceeds BC Wildfires standards. Give them the objective and they will usually figure out the safest, fastest and most efficient way to achieve it, often to a better standard than expected.
Equipment team leading the way
I recently read the BC Budget. I can barely balance a cheque book but it appears that the money generated to the Crown by stumpage (tax on each m3 of wood harvested) doesn’t even cover the cost of running the BC Forest Service much less contribute to all the other needs we have.
It appears to me that what generates the most money for the Crown is income tax. The more jobs, the lower the social costs and the more money available to pay for all our other programs.
I have to ask those of you who seem hell-bent on shutting down the forest industry, how are you going to pay for all the services we demand from government and who is going to fight our wildfires?
Suggestions: a) The BC Government via BC Wildfire should support the contracting sector to ensure they are viable and able to assist with wildfires when required.
There is lots of work to be done to improve forest health and wildfire resiliency. The current planning, approval and funding methods for these projects are too complicated and costly. The forest industry could generate income from this work instead of the current short term, taxpayer funded, overpriced model . This work would help sustain contractors through down turns so they are available when needed for wildfire response.
b) BC Wildfire should consider a rotating schedule of guaranteed standby through the fire season to help ensure contractors viability. Road building crews are usually the best suited for wildfire response as it closely mimics control line construction. Required response times and compensation would depend on the current fire danger.
c) The Ministry of Forests should adjust, revise, or even eliminate the Stumpage System to reflect the actual costs of operating. This will encourage innovative forest practices and job creation and help ensure the viability of our harvest contractors.
Again, the forest companies, their harvest contractors, equipment and crews play a key role in wildfire response. We would be lost without them.
I sent this 10 minute presentation out to my customers to make sure they are aware of the research so they can make better decisions in the field. Let me know what you think.
Having an at least adequate Safe Zone is a key component of LACES and Wildfire Entrapment Avoidance. All wildland fire fighters on every fire must always know where their safe zone is and how to get there. During recent wildfire events many of us who live, work, and / or play in rural and remote BC have been on our own more than expected and may have to identify and evaluate Safe Zones with little outside help or advice.
The information in the BC Wildfire S100 is vague and outdated. As a followup to a close call in 2021 I researched information from the US and realized many of the Safe Zones I have established in the past 20 years were really just parking spots and turnarounds. Fortunately other than some singed hair no injuries occurred.
The US Forest Service (USFS) updated it’s Safe Zone size guidelines and decsion making process in 2014. In early 2025 they updated it again and produced a decsion making app to help with evaluating our choice.
I have messed around with the app a bit and don’t have a good handle on it’s usefullness to us in BC or if it is accurate enough for site specific decision making. I have watched the instructional video and it has very valuable information on the how’s and why’s of the researchers data and decision making process in establishing the guidelines.
Since 2017 I have incorporated the new USFS Safe Zone Guidelines into the MacLeod S100 Wildfire for Industry. This spring I revised the content to include these most recent updates.
I had the privilege to have a booth at the recent Interior Logging Association Convention and Tradeshow in Kamloops.
Good work to Todd and Nancy and the ILA on producing a quality and valuable event and displaying such an important segment of the forest industry.
It was a pretty unique perspective to stand in a booth and watch the contractors, their families and many of their crewmembers come by. These are not the folks setting forest policy, rules or standards. This is the group that has to be able to roll with those punches and come up with a way to make, and provide, a living in the woods. I came away with the feeling that they can resolve a lot of our problems if we just give them the room to move then get out of the way.
I was struck by how valuable this industry is to the province. There were a few fifth-generation logging family kids in baby carriages roll by. I wondered how many people have made a good living off their parents, grandparents, great grandparents and even a few great-great grandparents over the years. How much tax was paid, food put on tables, homes provided, and how many rural communities thrived for those generations? All this was accomplished with little or no government grants or assistance, just a willingness to take a risk and get things done.
Maybe those kids in baby carriages will be able to do the same with the trees growing on those areas their ancestors logged three and four generations ago.
From a wildfire perspective, we would be lost without this group providing us help. On the prevention side they can reduce fuel loads while generating income for the province instead of the current excessively costly and wasteful methods. On the response side we would be lost without them providing their crews and equipment, at considerable risk, to establish control lines quickly and efficiently.
I am not sure how we would ever replace the benefits this group provides to all the residents of BC.
As I described in my March 24 post, my 2024 Safety Audit indicated I have been negligent in my Hazard, Close Call and Incident reporting involving entrapments and burn-overs when responding to wildfires with heavy equipment.
Hazard observations, Close Call and Incident Reports provide us with the free lessons and are key components of any safety management system. I should know better so am trying to make amends with the info below.
Almost every wildfire responder I talk to in the off season has a close call story. We are all getting complacent about working in close proximity to large and intense wildfires. I am very worried that we are going to have a large-scale entrapment/burn-over related tragedy in the near future.
Stopping for photos. Beware of Complacency.
Extreme caution is required here. A dead radio battery, sprained ankle, electrical glitch, blown hose, tree across the road, flat tire, undetected spot fire or any other minor problem would make the situation much worse very quickly.
All my fire response experience is as a contractor on a when needed/as available basis. Starting in 2017 my focus has been on Line Location and Construction Supervision working with industry heavy equipment teams. We are usually at the head of the fire doing Initial Attack. All the incidents described below involve heavy equipment supplied by industry.
Common Factors in Fire Entrapments
Factor # 1 is from my personal experience. Factors 2 to 7 are from US Forest Service research.
Gap in supervision/leadership
Small fires or quiet portion of large fire
Light fuels
Change in wind direction and/or speed
Steep slopes
Occur in peak burn periods
Most entrapments occur within 17 minutes of a wildfire “blowing up”.
Supervision and Leadership
Almost all the close calls and incidents described below had poor supervision and leadership as a root cause or at least contributing factor. The supervisors were from BC Wildfire, Structural Fire Crews, other Government Agencies and Industry.
I have seldom encountered poor supervision because of negligence. We have all had a lot of turn-over in recent years. Inexperience, poor training, and lack of support are more often why supervisors struggle. Most are just very conscientious about wanting to get the job done and maybe try too hard or stay too long.
Good supervision and leadership is key to reducing the chances of wildfire entrapment and burn-overs:
Establish LACES and Conduct a Crew Briefing.
Monitor for the WATCHOUT Situations.
Be aware that heavy equipment usually only has one escape route. Reduce the acceptable risk required to acheive objectives.
Maintain that workable 5 to 7 Span of Control.
Ensure everyone understands the Chain of Command but that information can go all directions.
Have a good workable system of tracking resources. Delegate this task to a Staging Area Manager when necessary.
Keep your head on a swivel. Avoid getting buried in a specific task.
Revise your objectives if you don’t have adequate resources.
Avoid setting objectives that require everything to go right. What can go wrong, will go wrong, usually at the worst possible time.
Treat your crew the way you would like to be treated. Always think about their family.
Always consider the Risks and Rewards of any planned work.
Encourage input and feedback from your operators.
Address any safety related crew concerns about the planned work promptly.
Base your actions on current and expected fire behavior. (Weather and fire forecasts)
Anticipate increasing fire intensity and leave early.
It is better to be in the Safe Zone an hour too early than a minute too late.
Decide when to withdraw to your Safe Zone based on the travel time of your slowest machine (Bunchers = 3 kph on good road)
Make sure your folks are adequately trained, give them clear directions, check that they are doing the assigned tasks safely and correctly, and implement appropriate actions to correct any outages.
Our number 1 daily objective should always be that all our workers go home healthy and safe at the end of every shift.
Let’s reel this in, improve our supervision, stay a little further away from active fire, leave a little earlier, and increase our close call and incident reports and investigations.
Here are the anecdotal incident summaries as I remember them. These all occurred on fires I was working and some of the errors that contributed to the incident were mine. None involved any injuries but this was mostly due to good luck.
2017
1. During initial response an equipment team stayed too long and tried too hard to contain a rapidly intensifying Rank 4-5 wildfire. Heavy equipment had to be abandoned and crews had to drive through the fire to get to safety.
Fire 4 hours after ignition, crews and equipment still looking for a way out to safety2. Later, the same fire took an unexpected long run overnight and burned over the heavy equipment parking site. Two lowbed operators walked through the fire to rescue the threatened equipment.
2018
3. A heavy equipment team was working the flank of a fire with the objective of cutting off a large switchback and squaring the control line. There was wet ground at the half way point of the proposed line.
The wind swung 90 deg and increased speed substantially. The flank being worked became the head of the fire. Fire behavior increased rapidly from Rank 2/3 to Rank 4/5. The supervisors gave everyone the notice to withdraw. With- in 15 minutes two bulldozers got stuck and an excavator broke a track pin at the head of the fire with spot fires igniting around them.
A rookie (first week) BC Wildfire Crew Leader took charge and coordinated the withdrawal. The threatened operators and their machines were able to make it to a parking spot. Most of the operators were able to get to safety via the number one escape route but 5 were cut off and were unaware of the second escape route.
A supervisor drove around to escort them out. The workers had to drive through active Rank 3 to Rank 5 fire to get to safety.
Escape Route # 2
When a head count was complete one worker was unaccounted for. Two supervisors drove back into the fire to search for him until he was located with another crew.
4, Later in the same fire there was a group of operators that refused unsafe work. They felt the plan and objectives were too aggressive and put the operators and equipment at unnecessary risk.
2021
5. On the first day of the first big fire of the year a buncher was trapped by rapidly spreading fire. Airtankers had to drop retardant on the machine to get it out to safety.
6. Four times industry run teams stayed too long at the head of the fire as the weather got hotter and drier and the winds increased. Adjacent fire behavior varied from Rank 3 to Rank 5. All operators and equipment made it out but any equipment problems would have resulted in losses.
7. Four pieces of heavy equipment were utilizing an alternate and untested evacuation route. The trip took longer than expected and a Rank 5 fire burned over them for about 500 m. They were able to keep rolling and made it through unscathed. One of the operators had 20 years of experience on a Unit Crew and said that was his closest call. He was expecting his first child in four days.
8. A large fire took a late day aspect and terrain induced run towards a ranch and rural community. The residents had vowed to stay no matter what. A supervisor saw the intensity of the blowup and realized the risk it posed to the residents. With the help of a local the supervisor travelled an alternate route into the community with the intent of talking the residents into leaving for safety. He found 30 well meaning, brave, but ill equipped and generally untrained volunteers who had showed up to help the residents and were refusing to leave.
All escape routes appeared compromised but there was a large meadow that, based on the existing S100 training, appeared large enough to keep everyone safe. The supervisor convinced the residents to move to the safe zone as the fire approached. The safe zone provided adequate protection from the radiant heat and ember blizzard. However, the plume of superheated gas and smoke associated with the Rank 5 inferno was rolling out well ahead of the main fire, often only 50 ft over their heads. This plume would periodically ignite creating tremendous heat. The residents had to take survival actions several times.
Research from the US Forest Service says 1.2 km Safe Separation Distance is required for this fire behavior
During the post incident review, I discovered the US Forest Service has conducted considerable research into Safe Zones and we needed to be much further away. The information in the BC S100 is out of date.
9. An equipment team was constructing line approximately 1 to 2 km away from the fire flank. The constructed line was the only escape route and there was a pinch point approximately 200 meters from the fire edge.
A Line Locator suffered a medical emergency due to heat stroke. There was confusion regarding the medivac and poor communications, The supervisor of the equipment group was acting as the Lookout at the pinch point but left to coordinate the evacuation. While he was gone the fire picked up intensity and a Rank 5 fire ran to within 50 meters of the pinch point and continued past for two km. Any minor change in wind direction would have cut off the escape route.
10. Two industry supervisors were utilized as Line Locators and Construction Supervisors. They ribboned the proposed line successfully and, by radio instructed the equipment operators to start following the pink ribbon line. No Crew Briefing was provided. The operators followed the line into a deep, rocky gulley with steep sides. They couldn’t make their way out and couldn’t reach the industry supervisors on the radio. Helicopter bucketing and support from BC Wildfire crews was required to get them out to safety.
The industry supervisors were located off site. They had misunderstood their instructions so weren’t supervising the heavy equipment and hadn’t checked in with their BCWS Supervisor before leaving the fire.
2022
11. A heavy equipment team left the staging area to build downhill guard through thick timber with a heavy load of deadfall. The supervisor organized the Leader of a Structure Protection crew working off the staging area to act as a Lookout. He stressed with the Lookout that the equipment’s only way out was back up towards the fire so lots of notice of any increase in fire activity would be required to get everyone back up the line and out to safety in time.
Approximately two hours later a Line Locator came up the line to the staging area to shuttle a pickup truck. He noted that the fire had run right to the staging area and the Structure Protection crew had departed. It was unlikely the heavy equipment would make it back to staging before their route was burned over.
The heavy equipment group found another way out and with the help of an adjacent BC Wildfire Crew all the operator’s pickups were shuttled down the road.
When the incident was discussed with the Lookout it was discovered that he had no experience with heavy equipment and didn’t realize how slow it travelled.
2023
12. a) An equipment group was asked to build a downhill guard towards the fire, late in the day, with a fire behavior warning in place. The south facing terrain was steep and rocky. If the fire wasn’t held at this proposed line the next opportunity was several kilometers away. The fire was burning in very high value timber.
The crew referred to the 18 Watch Out Situations and refused the work.
The fire crossed the proposed line 1 hour later.
b) A buncher was cutting a control line downhill in thick timber with a heavy load of deadfall. A Unit Crew was building a line uphill toward him but struggling in the steep ground and heavy fuels. Any work the buncher could do would alleviate considerable work for them.
The buncher came to a steep gulley. The operator and the Line Locator walked it and thought there was a possible route through. The slope was very steep and south facing, there was active fire below them with unburnt heavy fuels between, the weather was getting hotter and drier and the wind increasing.
The team decided to back off and the buncher walked out the 1 hour to the road to park. Fifty meters from the road the buncher suffered a mechanical breakdown and was parked there for 18 hours.
The fire picked up and crossed the gulley where the buncher had turned around 45 minutes after departure.
13. Over two days an equipment team comprised of 15 machines, working the head of the fire, was chased out 5 times by advancing flames. Each time the last few machines had fire all around them as they departed.
On the second day the Rank 5 fire was advancing to the temporary staging at a gravel pit 1 km from the highway. Traffic on the highway was bumper to bumper and crawling as two communities evacuated. There was Rank 4 fire on both sides of the highway.
The crew decided they did not want to get trapped on the hwy in traffic and chose the gravel pit as the best choice for a survival zone. They started to improve it.
Lowbeds are heros!
At the last minute lowbeds became available and the highway traffic cleared. The equipment was moved another 10 km or so to a large field but still at the head of the fire. The last three lowbed trips drove through active fire. Another equipment group joined them there. The equipment cleared the surface fuels to mineral soil and parked in the middle. By the time they had completed the work the fire was going around and over them.
The adjacent fire camp had the fire go over and around it.
Parked but not hopeful about its chances of survival
As the operators left the site to head for home they turned onto the Trans Canada Hwy. The fire burned over them again while they travelled out of the area. The highway was still open, traffic was heavy and visibility zero for several km.
2024
A fire had taken a large run the previous day and adequate extra supervision had not arrived on site. An equipment team (Crew 1) was trying to establish a control line above the fire. A separate group had walked their machines 4 km to improve a pump and fill site for water delivery.
A second (Crew 2) full strike team was still working on another road system in the area burning before the big run.
The terrain was very steep (40% to 70%), east facing. with a very heavy load of large diameter deadfall. Fuel indices were all very high. The supervisor recognized the risks associated with the slopes and fuels and started the team early to avoid the anticipated heat of the day.
At the 0400 startup the temp was 12deg C., RH was 45% and wind was calm. Fire behavior was Rank 2
The supervisor got the Crew 1 going on the new line, assigned a young skidder operator as Lookout and informed an arriving BC Wildfire Crew of the work, situation and risks. A young BCWS crew member was assigned as a second Lookout. The supervisor left the site to coordinate the Crew 2 activities stating he would be monitoring the weather and would return before the day heated up.
At approximately 0630 the sun came up and hit the east facing slope below Crew 1. Fire activity and rate of spread immediately intensified to Rank 3/4 and started a rapid uphill run. Both the skidder operator and BCWS Lookouts identified the increasing fire behavior immediately and initiated a withdrawal. An alternate escape route was identified for the group working at the pump site to speed their escape.
At the time of the blowup temperature was 18 deg. C., RH was 35% and the winds calm. In review the increased fire activity was likely due to slope and fuel.
The BCWS crewmember requested a helicopter which arrived promptly and bucketed the approaching fire while the equipment made its way out.
The Supervisor that had left the Crew 1 location had the roster of who was on site so there was some confusion during the final head count. Eventually the BCWS crewperson and the skidder operator determined that everyone made it to the Safe Zone well before the fire threatened their work area.
